

13 The ANC and the world

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In focusing on structural issues of reconstructing the Mission in Exile, the ANC could not lose sight of the geopolitics and other strategic issues that were heavily influenced by the Cold War. These could make or break the organisation's progress and struggle for liberation, and the ANC thus extended the struggle against apartheid to the international arena when it was banned in 1960. This aspect of the ANC's policy became crucial, and both the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) provided a forum and a political battlefield where worldwide support against the apartheid state could be marshalled. The liberation movement developed strategies based on a conscious strategic and tactical decision to align the organisation with the Soviet Union, but such delicate political manoeuvres had to be balanced against the fact that the African continent was divided according to the strategic and economic needs of the superpowers. Britain, America, France, Germany and Italy maintained close relations with South Africa and states in North and West Africa. But the OAU and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) in Britain, the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) correctly judged the moral and material advantages of an anti-South African stance by establishing productive working relationships with the ANC.

The ANC and the United Nations

Most of the major Western powers aligned themselves with the apartheid state by resisting the UN General Assembly initiatives that threatened their economic and strategic interests. After the Second World War, these countries tacitly supported the South African government's claim that its treatment of citizens of Indian origin, and its racial policies in general, were domestic concerns rather than issues in which the General Assembly could legitimately intervene.

Before the formation of ACOA, concerned Americans who supported the ANC's 1952 Defiance Campaign set up an ad hoc support group. They adopted the name Americans for South African Resistance (AFSAR) and raised funds

for the campaign. Their sources of information about the Defiance Campaign included press reports and ZK Matthews, who was based in New York from June 1952. He was in the United States for a year as the Henry Luce Visiting Professor of World Christianity at the Union Theological Seminary, and his son, Joe, kept him well informed about the campaign.

After the Indian government managed to put racial conflict in South Africa on the agenda of the UN General Assembly in September 1952,¹ African and Asian delegates invited ZK Matthews to give expert testimony, an unusual procedure at the time. Their argument was that no one could have spoken with greater authority. AFSAR helped organise a letter-writing campaign to the UN and the US Mission, seeking approval for Matthews to testify. But the United States government made it clear that it would vote against his appearance. George Houser recalled that on a visit to ZK's apartment at the Union Theological Seminary during this period, he saw two men leaving. Matthews told him they were from the US State Department 'and came here to urge me not to insist on speaking at the UN. If I did, the US would vote against me', and probably revoke his permit to study and stay in the United States (US).²

During the 1952 General Assembly meeting, South Africa's official representatives contended that the UN had no authority to take binding decisions on South Africa under Article 2 (7), and under Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter dealing with the promotion of human rights. The UN Charter stated that the General Assembly had no jurisdiction because South Africa posed no threat to peace. This legalistic interpretation of the UN Charter led to an acrimonious division in the General Assembly, which then had to adopt two entirely different resolutions with the same preambles. As neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council had a regular or permanent commission to watch and report on events in South Africa, 18 Asian and Latin American governments called for the establishment of a commission of three members to study the racial situation in South Africa. Created in terms of Resolution 616A (VII), the commission comprised Hernan Cruz (Chile), Henri Langier (France) and Dantes Bellegarde (Haiti), and later evolved into what became known as the General Assembly's Special Committee on Apartheid.³

Because of these developments, the ANC strove hard to place the UN at the core of its strategic objectives concerning international affairs and politics

1 See the various archival documents available at www.anc.docs.org.za/history.

2 G Houser, *No One Can Stop the Rain: Glimpses of Africa's Liberation Struggle*, Pilgrim Press, New York, 1989, p 17. See also position paper by Collin Gonze et al, 'South African Crisis and United States Policy', *Africa Today Pamphlet 5*, American Committee on Africa, New York, 1962; J Barber and J Barratt, *South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945-88*, Southern Books, Johannesburg, 1990; P Henshaw, 'Britain and South Africa at the United Nations: South West Africa', 'Treatment of Indians' and 'Race Conflict, 1946-1961', *South African Historical Journal*, No 31, November 1994, pp 80-102.

3 For the UN Special Committee on Apartheid documents and other archival material, see www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history, including O Tambo's speeches at the UN. See also R Barros, *African States and the United Nations versus Apartheid*, Carlton Press, New York, 1967.

throughout the 1960s. The fundamental principles of the ANC's foreign policy were developed over a long period and are reflected in many documents. Among these are well-known policy documents such as 'African Claims', adopted in 1943 and subsequently published as a pamphlet, presidential addresses and NEC reports to various annual conferences, as well as the Freedom Charter. Various ANC memoranda sent to the UN and other international bodies (including statements and position papers on specific issues) also reflect the ANC's foreign policy. The main goal of this policy was to isolate the apartheid regime, and achieve freedom for all the oppressed people of South Africa, by creating a non-racial democracy based on equality for all, and removing all forms of racism and discrimination. It was believed that these goals could be achieved partly by pursuing the enforcement of economic sanctions against South Africa and securing the country's political isolation in international institutions and social, political and sporting affairs. The General Assembly's Special Committee on Apartheid became the specific focus of many of the ANC's activities⁴ and offered badly needed access to the international community. In July 1963, for example, Duma Nokwe and Tennyson Makiwane proposed the following measures to the Special Committee:

All countries should ... implement immediately the resolutions adopted at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly which included [a request that all members break diplomatic relations with South Africa or avoid their establishment; close their ports to South African ships and prevent their ships from entering South African ports; boycott all South African goods and refrain from selling anything to South Africa; and refuse landing and passage to all South African passenger aircraft⁵ ... countries having involved themselves with the oppressors in South Africa should withdraw forthwith ... a blacklist should be drawn up of companies ... that collaborate with the South African Government ... the UN should demand the immediate release of all political prisoners ... banned persons ... and the freeing of scores [of internal exiles] in concentration camps.⁶

4 See www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history, see for example, Oliver Tambo, 'United Nations Must Take Action to Destroy Apartheid', statement at meeting of the special political committee of the UN General Assembly, New York, 29/10/1963; 'Make Accomplices of Apartheid Account for Their Conduct', statement at meeting of the UN Special Committee on Apartheid, 12/3/1964.

5 UN General Assembly, *Official Records*, Resolution 1761, XVII Session, 6/11/1962, New York; J Nelson, 'Some External Aspects of Internal Conflict within South Africa', www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history.

6 Hearing of Petitioners, Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, Summary Record of the 17th Meeting, A/AC 115/SR17, 10/7/1963, New York, 1965, pp 9-10; see also Tambo's presentation before the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly, *Summary Records*, Special Political Committee, 18th Session, A/SPC/SR 395, 8/10/1963, New York, 1963, p 105; Nelson, 1964. The UN notes and archival documents are available at www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history.

Appearances by Tambo, Nokwe, Resha and Tennyson Makiwane before committees of the UN General Assembly became annual events from the early 1960s until 1967. From 1967 to 1970, ANC position papers became the major form of communication with the UN and were submitted to specific UN committees. The Special Committee on Apartheid was always accessible and eagerly received the testimony of petitioners and written statements from groups and individuals. On two occasions, the Special Committee travelled abroad to gather evidence on the ground. In 1964 they went to Europe, and in 1969 to Africa. In addition, two international conferences were held, one in 1966 in Brasilia, Brazil, and another the following year in Kitwe, Zambia. The Kitwe conference was sponsored by the OAU, attended by the representatives of 32 governments and included observers from several international organisations, as well as the African liberation movements. Among a number of recommendations and findings, the conference suggested that the General Assembly should adopt a declaration recognising the legitimacy of the liberation struggle of the peoples of South Africa, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the territories under Portuguese domination. A further call was made for the recognition of their inalienable right to equality, freedom and independence, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.⁷

ES Reddy, Principal Secretary of the Special Committee on Apartheid, not only tirelessly prepared, commissioned and published numerous studies on apartheid, but also acted as secretary for the Kitwe conference. The conference declared its committed support for economic sanctions and its opposition to the inhuman policies of apartheid, and expressed regret at the attitudes and actions of states that continued to collaborate with racist regimes in southern Africa, in contravention of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. It essentially deplored the continued supply of arms to South Africa, and the assistance provided by several Western governments and international companies in the development of South Africa's arms industry. This included the training of South African armed forces by some of the Western powers such as France, Italy and Britain.⁸

With the support of African, Asian and South American nations, several resolutions were passed in the General Assembly to isolate South Africa and impose sanctions. By the end of the 1960s, South Africa had been expelled from the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara, and as a result, the country was precluded from becoming a member of the

7 'International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa', *Sechaba*, 1 (11), November 1967, pp 14-5; J Nelson, *Some External Aspects of Internal Conflict within South Africa*, PhD thesis, George Washington University, 1975; Leiss, A (ed), *Apartheid and United Nations Collective Measures: An Analysis*, Cargegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1965; Barros, 1967; R Segal, *Sanctions against South Africa*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1964. See also relevant documents at www.anc.org.za/anc-docs/history.

8 *Sechaba*, *ibid*; OR Tambo, 'Make accomplices of apartheid account for their conduct', statement at meeting of the UN Special Committee on Apartheid, 12/3/1964, www.anc.org.za/anc-docs/history, including Reddy papers.

Economic Commission for Africa. In 1964, South Africa was expelled from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). In 1965 it was also excluded from the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). By 1970, South Africa had been expelled from a number of sporting bodies, including the International Olympic Committee and the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA).⁹ These successes in the diplomatic field were the fruits of the commitment of South Africans who had taken a conscious decision to go into exile and had worked tirelessly to continue the struggle for freedom.

In 1964, Duma Nokwe proposed that the UN should expel South Africa from the international body and intervene in the South African judicial system. These propositions were reiterated by Oliver Tambo in a 1968 position paper submitted to the UN, in which he also stated, 'the least that the United Nations can do is to enforce compliance with its resolutions by all member states, and consider appropriate action against those countries that undermine these decisions'.¹⁰ The UN failed to meet these basic expectations because of the immense influence wielded by the Western powers, and the United States in particular. From 1945 to 1957, the US consistently abstained from voting on resolutions that called for South Africa to reconsider its apartheid policies and to observe the Charter of the United Nations. The abstention was justified on the grounds that the world organisation was not competent to deal with the internal affairs of a member state. The US also opposed the functioning of the Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa during the years 1952-6.

During the 13th UN session in 1958, the US revised its position somewhat, and for the first time, voted with the majority to express 'regret and concern' that South Africa continued to flout the UN Charter. However, the US refused to allow the word 'condemn' to be added to the resolution. In the 25th General Assembly, the US voted against the resolution on sanctions which, although it was passed in the Special Political Committee by a vote of 47 in favour, 29 opposed and 18 abstentions, did not achieve the necessary two-thirds majority in the Plenary Session. Similar situations marked the 26th and 27th sessions.¹¹

9 See Y Tandon, 'The Organisation of African Unity and the Liberation of Southern Africa', in Potholm, C and Dale, R (eds), *Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics*, Free Press, New York, 1972, pp 245-61; A Leiss (ed), *Apartheid and United Nations Collective Measures: An Analysis*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1965; Barros, 1967; Segal, 1964; www.anc.org.za/docs/history.

10 OR Tambo, UN General Assembly, Document A/AC115/1222, New York, 1968, p 7; Nelson, 1964; www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history, on Tambo's UN speeches. See also D Nokwe letter, UN General Assembly, Special Committee on Apartheid, Document A/AC 115/L59, 13/2/1964, New York, 1964.

11 Gonze et al, 'South African Crisis and United States Policy', Section 2. See also 'UN Resolutions on African Issues at 20th Session of the General Assembly', *Africa Today*, March 1966, pp 9-12; on the corresponding British policy towards South Africa, see P Henshaw, 'Britain and South Africa at the United Nations'.

When the US and Britain later realised that they had become the main obstacles to the UN Security Council's anti-apartheid resolutions, they proposed the establishment of a trust fund, to which they pledged to donate 'huge' sums of money for South African refugees. Resha's 1966 report about his impression of the UN's Special Committee meeting on the trust fund argued that the proposal was a strategic manoeuvre on the part of both Britain and the United States, which would allow them to provide 'conscience money' for propaganda reasons. Both countries would be able to deflate criticism of their positions in the UN by arguing that they were giving material and moral support to the victims of apartheid.

In his address to the Special Committee, Resha articulated the ANC's standpoint. First, the trust fund was welcomed just like any other form of assistance for the liberation struggle, but the ANC would not accept it as a substitute for the imposition of sanctions against the Verwoerd regime. Second, the trust fund was to be used primarily to assist the victims of apartheid in South Africa – particularly the political prisoners and thousands of their dependants, as well as families who lost breadwinners through death in detention. The fund would also provide support for those who had been banished, banned or placed under house arrest. The ANC proposed a formula that allocated 80% of the funds to those inside South Africa and the remaining 20% to exiles for scholarships and technical training. This was the exact opposite of the disbursement method suggested by Britain and the US, which would have seen 80% of donations going to the exiles and only 20% to those in South Africa. The ANC would not allow the superpowers to create the perception among its supporters at home that those in exile were living in luxury as the main beneficiaries of UN funding.

Resha's intervention was welcomed by the majority of the UN committee members, much to the annoyance of the UK representatives. Britain also opposed the suggestion that funds sent to South Africa should be channelled through the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF), which had a proven capacity to distribute donor funds inside South Africa. Though the British representatives did not voice their objections in open debate, clandestine support was later given to John Vorster's efforts to ban the IDAF in South Africa.¹²

The geopolitics of the Cold War

Taking its cue from the 1954 ANC Executive Committee report¹³ on forming strategic alliances with other countries, the organisation initiated debate about choosing a superpower that would support the quest for liberation. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, South Africa was seen as a major ally of the capitalist system. Where, then, could the liberation movement

¹² Resha letter to Tambo, 16/2/1966, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 26, ANC Archives, UFH.

546 ¹³ See www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/lutuli.

turn for support and arms? Which country would make it possible for the liberation movement to train skilled freedom fighters who could direct and wage an armed struggle? What type of aid should be sought, and from whom? According to Matthews, the movement in exile recognised all too well that in order to pursue what would be a difficult struggle, it would need the support of a major – or at least significant – world power. The vested economic and strategic interests of the Cold War period made the choices extremely complex. Matthews¹⁴ conveyed the ANC leadership's thinking on the matter as follows:

We looked at the United States' war of independence and we asked, would these colonists have won against Britain without the support of France? And France was a feudal state, completely different from the people they were supporting. But France was supporting them because of its rivalry with the British, and they backed the independence movement. So we said, it's not a question of ideology, it's a question of practicality: which power will support a struggle such as this, or which powers will support us. We knew that the African states, generally speaking, were too weak. They didn't have military resources to support such a plan ... some of them had bigger resources. Egypt had bigger resources than other states, a bigger army but when we looked at the cost ... people have no idea of the cost of a struggle like this. You take one rifle, and you are training a chap for nine months. Do you know how much ammunition that fellow needs, just ammunition? You are talking of thousands of rounds of ammunition, just for one chap. So the cost of establishing an army, and so on, was prohibitive and therefore you had to be speaking of a power that can do it. So we took a decision, it might look like an obvious decision that now look, we have got the Soviet Union as the other power. The West is the trading partner of our country, they are not going to be involved in supporting any armed struggle.¹⁵ So we have to go to the Russians.

14 Interview with Joe Matthews, conducted by Sifiso Ndlovu and Bernard Magubane, 18 July 2001, Pretoria, SADET Oral History Project.

15 Tambo recalled how in the first years of exile he was in no hurry to visit Moscow. He was trying to avoid becoming embroiled in either camp during the Cold War, which intensified in the early 1960s. Even then, he spared no effort to obtain support for the ANC and Umkhonto from the West, largely in vain. When Tambo tried to visit the United States in May 1960 as a key participant in the Emergency Action Conference on South Africa, convened by the American Committee on Africa, the State Department delayed the granting of his visa, causing him to miss the conference. He went on a speaking tour afterwards. George Hauser, for many years Secretary of the American Committee on Africa, wrote later that his organisation 'was rather surprised to learn that the US government was giving Tambo problems with his visa. I called Washington and was at first told he was "ineligible" for entry, for undisclosed reasons'. After 'feverish protests ... finally in June the government decision was reversed. But it was too late. Tambo had missed our conference'. Cited in Vladimir Shubin, *ANC: A View from Moscow*, Mayibuye Books, Bellville, 1999, pp 47-8.

The ANC was conscious that the independent African states were militarily, politically and economically too weak to provide much help. They had neither the military nor the financial resources to sustain what would be a difficult and prolonged struggle against the South African regime. Although Egypt had a large army, it could not afford the financial resources that would be required to sustain the everyday needs of ANC combatants and guerrillas. The enemy was also formidable in terms of available resources. In 1960-1, the total defence expenditure of the South African state was \$85.8 million. In 1961-2 it rose to \$144 million; in 1962-3 it increased to \$156 million; in 1964-5 it had risen to \$252 million; in 1966-7 it was \$307.02 million.¹⁶ On the military front, the South African government was getting stronger as it received significant support from major Western powers, particularly France, from which it purchased three submarines. On 22 February 1967, Defence Minister PW Botha revealed that a radar complex, which would provide an early warning system against enemy aircraft, shielded South Africa's northern frontiers. He also pointed out that South Africa's coastline was protected by the Decca navigational system, costing \$8.4 million.¹⁷ By 1969, France had become the leading supplier of arms to South Africa. In addition to the submarines, helicopters and Mirage jet aircraft already procured, Botha announced that South Africa, in cooperation with a French electronics firm, had developed the Cactus air defence missile system, officially approved and partly financed by the French government. In addition, South Africa was manufacturing the Impala strike-trainer aircraft under licence from an Italian firm, using a British-designed Rolls Royce engine manufactured in Italy.¹⁸

It became obvious to the ANC that the financial cost of creating, training and maintaining its own army of combatants would be astronomical, and that a strategic relationship with a superpower was more than justified. The ANC leadership was also struck by the large disparities in aid allocated by the Soviet Union to the organisation and other liberation movements, and urged socialist countries to provide equitable support to all the African liberation movements. According to Matthews, the Russians never really paid much attention to this issue, despite repeated protests:

I said it's a scandal that you can give, say, as an example, \$10 000 to Frelimo and then give \$900 000 to the ANC. I mean, how do you fellows justify this? I wrote a memorandum saying that the struggle, our struggles, were interlinked. There was an unholy alliance of Portugal, South Africa,

16 See Tandon, 1972; 'South Africa: Adoption of Defence Amendment Act: Expansion of Defence Forces: Purchases of Aircraft and Submarines from France', *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 16 (1967-8), p 22116.

17 South Africa Defence White Paper, 3/6/1964. See also S Ratcliffe, 'The Shifting Dominance: The Foundations of the Armaments Industry during the 1960s', *Africa Perspective*, 25, 1984, pp 24-40.

548 18 *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1969-1970, B 294.

Rhodesia and so on. So, these movements must be equally supported, all of them. For the sake of the South African struggle, you had to support them all and not pick and choose.¹⁹

While the top Soviet officials understood his concerns, the problem was that funds were allocated by bureaucrats who believed their task was to support foreign-based movements that were close to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Thus, the ANC benefited financially through its connection with the SACP. However, the most important element of the Soviet Union's financial assistance and support for the training of ANC combatants was that it was unconditional. Despite being the recipient of considerably larger sums of money than other African liberation movements, the ANC was not expected to adopt socialism or communist policies if they emerged as the eventual victors in the South African conflict.²⁰ Shubin corroborates Matthews on this point, highlighting that in 1963 the first allocation to the ANC in foreign currency was \$300 000, while the SACP received \$56 000. The ANC and SACP ranked ninth and tenth among 85 recipients of financial support from Moscow. The MPLA in Angola and ZAPU in Zimbabwe received \$50 000 dollars each, while the newly established Communist Party of Lesotho received \$52 000.²¹

The ANC and the AAM: solidarity in the struggle

When Tennyson Makiwane arrived in London in 1959, he and Vella Pillay and Abdul Minty played a significant role in the newly established Boycott Movement, that was renamed the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) on 16 March 1960. By the beginning of 1959, according to Gurney, the movement against apartheid in Britain had been growing for more than a decade. It embraced a network of organisations across the political spectrum, though mainly on the Left, including the Movement for Colonial Freedom, Christian Action, Committee of African Organisations (CAO), the National Council of Civil Liberties, the African Bureau, student bodies, some trade unions, the Communist Party and sections of the Labour Party. The CAO's 1959 report claimed that it had set up a boycott subcommittee in response to a request from the ANC, and worked closely with Makiwane and the South African Freedom Movement.²² The AAM was not a stand-alone movement, but was inspired and formed as a result of a

19 Interview with Joe Matthews.

20 Ibid. On the relationship between the ANC and the Soviet Union see Shubin, 1999.

21 Shubin, 1999, pp 53 and 62, offers a more in-depth analysis of Soviet Union assistance.

22 See C Gurney, 'A Great Cause: The Origins of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, June 1959–March 1960', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 26 (1), March 2000, pp 123–44. See also www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history, 'The Anti-Apartheid Movement: A 40-year Perspective', South Africa House, London, 25–26 June 1999; A Lissoni, *The Anti-Apartheid Movement, Britain and South Africa: Anti-Apartheid Protest vs Real Politik – A History of the AAM and its Influence on the British Government's Policy towards South Africa in 1964*, Honours Dissertation, SOAS, University of London, 2000.

solemn appeal made on behalf of oppressed people in South Africa by Chief Albert Luthuli. It was directly linked to the liberation struggle in South Africa and operated as an instrument of solidarity with the people of South Africa.²³ The AAM policy was to campaign for sport, cultural, academic and economic boycotts of apartheid South Africa.

Abdul Minty remembered that soon after the formation of the Boycott Movement, the South Africa Foundation was set up as a joint venture between the South African government and the private sector, with initial funding of £260 000. This was a princely sum, considering that the Boycott Movement had meagre resources, with 'no budget, not even of five or 10 shillings' when it was established in 1959.²⁴ The British government welcomed the formation of organisations like the South Africa Foundation in order to protect its interests as the largest investor in South Africa and also its major trading partner and source of military equipment. The AAM had to counter powerful vested interests and lobby groups, but the combination of reliable information, appropriate policy and mass mobilisation of the public created a formidable force.

Examples of the Boycott Movement's activities include a 24-hour vigil outside South Africa House in London and a meeting at Holborn Hall on 26 June 1959, as well as several poster parades and pickets at shopping centres. Some of the protest stories had a light-hearted human element and humour, as recalled by Minty regarding the vigil outside South Africa House:

You were not allowed to demonstrate within one mile of [the British] parliament, so we had to keep walking ... in the gutter. So 20 or 30 of us assembled to march in the gutter around South Africa House. We marched until 11 o'clock in the evening and eventually, without looking at my watch, I found I was the only one left. What should I do? The hours passed. There were many people walking around London during the night. At 7.30 in the morning, Joan Hymans arrived with a flask of coffee. She was going to work at the BBC. I said, 'Please call some people. I just cannot walk any more'. By 8.30 am two or three people arrived.²⁵

On 19 July 1959, Tennyson Makiwane was in a line-up of speakers, including Julius Nyerere, Joshua Nkomo, Kanyama Chiume and Labour's shadow colonial secretary, James Callaghan, at a demonstration in Trafalgar Square. On 17 January 1960, the Boycott Movement held a successful conference in London that attracted 250 delegates from 168 organisations. They were asked to set up local boycott committees. By mid-February 1961, the sales of *Boycott News*

²³ A Minty, 'The Anti-Apartheid Movement: What Kind of History?', www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/; 'The Anti-Apartheid Movement: A 40-year Perspective', South Africa House, London, 25-26 June 1999. As a result of Chief Luthuli's call, a parallel boycott movement was launched in South Africa at the Curries Fountain Stadium, Durban, in 1959.

²⁴ Minty, nd.

²⁵ Ibid.

had reached 100 000 copies, with 30 000 more on order. More than 700 000 introductory leaflets were circulated, as well as 550 000 pamphlets listing goods that should be boycotted. March, which had been declared boycott month, kicked off with a rally in Trafalgar Square attended by 15 000 people. Demonstrations also took place in Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool and Nottingham. When the AAM was formed, the Boycott Movement changed its tactics and strategy, moving beyond appeals to individuals and organisations to boycott South African goods. For the first time, the AAM suggested that international action against South Africa could be justified on the grounds that apartheid threatened the security of the whole African continent. This was followed by a memorandum on economic sanctions, arguing that the moral pressure of the consumer boycott was no longer sufficient.²⁶

In 1962, both the South African Sports Association and the AAM scored a major victory with the expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic Games. Massive anti-apartheid protests at sports matches in Britain and public action by the AAM subsequently also put an end to major rugby, cricket and other sports tours.

Throughout 1963 and 1964, Mazisi Kunene and his colleagues in the ANC's London office worked with AAM through its second world campaign to intensify the campaign for economic sanctions. They linked their activity to the Rivonia Trial and the plight of political prisoners. Kunene argued that the challenge was to elevate the campaign from one of protest about political prisoners to one emphasising the underlying cause of detentions, and the need to fight for the ideals espoused by the Rivonia Trialists. The ANC London Committee (spearheaded by Kunene) and the AAM also designed a programme of action in relation to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference that would demand a concrete policy on South Africa and support for UN resolutions. They compiled leaflets and wrote two pamphlets, one on Britain's history of appeasement, the other on Rivonia and its significance. Kunene was also successful in finding a publisher for Mandela's Rivonia speeches,²⁷ *No Easy Walk to Freedom*, edited by Ruth First.

During November 1964, at a successful mass meeting on sanctions organised by the ANC and the AAM, all the speakers condemned the British government's sale of 16 Buccaneer aircraft to South Africa. The meeting was preceded by a march of about 6 000 students from 40 universities. Speakers included Clive Jenkins of the Aviation Workers Trade Union. As a sequel to the November campaign, a large international anti-apartheid conference was planned for

26 Gurney, 2000. The solidarity network also operated in socialist and Scandinavian countries. A comprehensive and comparative study of such initiatives is beyond the scope of this volume and chapter. See T Sellstrom, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa: Formation of Popular Opinion 1950-1970*, Vol 1, Uppsala, 1999; Iina Soiri and Pekka Peltola, *Finland and National Liberation in Southern Africa*, Uppsala, 1999.

27 ANC London Office, report by Mazisi Kunene, 26/6/1964, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 12, ANC Archives, UFH.

1965 to consolidate strategy on the arms campaign and economic sanctions. The AAM also participated in parallel campaigns to expose what it termed the 'unholy alliance' of Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia.

By April 1966, the ANC's London office and the AAM had established a solid working relationship. They began publishing a weekly news bulletin, articles two or three times per month, one or two weekly sets of news items, and occasional papers focusing on, for example, South African trade or South West Africa. Nine of the 50 individuals and organisations that subscribed to the bulletin were British anti-apartheid groups. The following newspapers and broadcasters were furnished with material from the bulletin: *Bakhtar News* (Afghanistan), *Anti-Apartheid News*, *Hsinhua News Agency*, *Zimbabwe Review*, *Solidarity* (Czechoslovakia), *Remarques Africaines* (Brussels), *Frit Danmark*, *Politisk Revy* (Denmark), *Dagens Nyheter* (Sweden), Radio Berlin International and Radio Moscow. Newspapers like the *Guardian* in London and the *Daily Nation* in Nairobi also used the ANC's material occasionally. Other media included BPRO Television in Holland and *Record*, a newsletter of the London-based Transport and General Workers Union.²⁸ Plans to expand the subscription list included approaches to embassies and high commissions, libraries and international organisations. Financing the bulletin was a major burden, because both the AAM and the ANC's London office ran on a tight budget. The multimedia strategy included a collection of photographs and paintings used for exhibitions in Holland, Britain and Germany.²⁹

The impact of the joint solidarity action by the ANC and the AAM on international relations and the policies of the superpowers was reflected in the emergence of anti-apartheid movements in Europe, Scandinavia, North America and almost all the countries of the Commonwealth.

Foreign relations and the ISIRD

Immediately following the demise of the United Front, the ANC began establishing offices and structures in various countries. According to Joe Matthews, the major problems faced by the External Mission involved communication, financial support and leadership.³⁰ Offices were opened in London, Cairo, Ghana, Algiers and Dar es Salaam to improve communication. The offices in Cairo and Algiers were headed respectively by Mzwai Piliso and Johnny Makhathini, both of whom played important roles in facilitating the training of MK cadres. In Algeria, the presidency later provided much-needed material and financial support for the ANC.³¹

28 ANC London Office Report, April 1966, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 26, ANC Archives, UFH.

29 The paintings and photographs form part of the Mayibuye Archives at UWC.

30 Interview with Joe Matthews.

31 See OR Tambo letter to Houari Boumedienne, the Algerian president who donated 50 000 francs to the ANC without being asked for funding, 7/2/1966, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 24, ANC Archives, UFH.

The External Mission's key function was a diplomatic one: to rally support for the cause. But it also coordinated the movement of MK trainees and students, and the duties of the foreign offices were to ensure that the host government and political parties not only understood the struggle for emancipation of the African people in South Africa, but were also encouraged to offer support.

In December 1962 the London Committee of the ANC (Congress Group), set up in late 1961, established the Information Service and International Relations Division (ISIRD) to campaign for the isolation of the apartheid regime. The London Committee included Mazisi Kunene, Joe Matthews (after his relocation from Lesotho), Mendi Msimang and Tambo, until the last two were permanently moved to the ANC's Tanzanian headquarters in 1963. Numerous delegations were sent to represent the ANC's cause at world forums: the UN, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the International Union of Students and the International Labour Organisation. ANC members attended conferences hosted by the IUS, Afro-Asian Solidarity and the African People's, to name a few. But there was still no organised contact of value in the US, Canada, Latin America, Western Europe and Asia. The ISIRD was meant to formalise and expand what scattered contacts there were throughout the world,³² in order to:

- step up general propaganda to sharply expose the effects of apartheid on every facet of South African life; present a proper image of the vanguard of the national liberation movement; work specifically to expand and buttress the movement for sanctions against South Africa and concentrate on countries violating the sanctions vote by their economic relations and military support of South Africa;
- counteract the efforts and propaganda of the authorities to lure immigrants to South Africa;
- counter the 'into the white laager' propaganda and efforts of the South Africa Foundation; and to
- direct, wherever possible, specialised propaganda and specific sections of the population – such as international organisations of youth, women, trade unions, sporting bodies, etc. – so as to expand the area of world solidarity with oppressed South Africa.

Press agencies – for example, *Reuters*, *Press Trust of India*, *United Press* – and individual friendly newspapers like *The Observer* and *New Statesman*, had to be kept informed about developments in the liberation movement and in South Africa. Robert Resha, 'the roving ambassador' based at the ANC administrative headquarters in Dar es Salaam, eventually led the ISIRD. Inten-

³² Letter to OR Tambo from 'Thunder', 5/1/1962, ANC London Archives, MCH02-13, Box 13, Mayibuye Archives, UWC.

sive lobbying was a major part of his mandate. The London office, which reported to him, pointed out that the few pamphlets they had prepared had taken months to publish and distribute, whereas six weeks would have been sufficient had there been a continuous research programme, supported by a good classification system and library, and provided the section dealing with publication and distribution was relieved of all other commitments and focused on this task alone.³³

In April 1964, Ronald Segal arranged an international conference on economic sanctions and published the record of proceedings as a book, *Sanctions against South Africa*. The aim of the conference was to root the sanctions issue in reality and move it out of the realm of posturing. In the end, 30 countries sent official delegations, most of them led by cabinet ministers or senior diplomats from Asia, Europe and Africa. Unofficial delegations of individual experts or representatives of political parties and NGOs came from another 14 countries. Tambo's speech, entitled 'Apartheid: The Indictment' was published as the opening chapter in Segal's book.³⁴

The ANC adopted a multifaceted approach to international solidarity platforms, avoiding a one-dimensional focus on fundraising or a parochial emphasis on the organisation's own struggle. Resha believed that various liberation movements became affiliates of international solidarity organisations because of the ANC's fraternal support, since the ANC was consistently vociferous in calling for political, material, financial and diplomatic support to be extended to the MPLA, FRELIMO, PAEGC, ZAPU and SWAPO. Significant contributions were also made in terms of intellectual content, strategies, tactics and policies adopted by such forums. For example, in 1965, the 512 delegates representing anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist forces from 82 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, made history by meeting in Cuba at AAPSO's conference in Havana to discuss practical ways of consolidating the solidarity and unity of those fighting against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. The debates became heated when the ANC delegation, led by Resha and Msimang, argued that the existing AAPSO structure had limitations, and proposed that Latin America be drawn into the fold. A major milestone was reached when the conference decided to establish the tri-continental African, Asian and Latin American Solidarity Organisation (AALASO). But the ANC opposed the choice of Havana as the new organisation's headquarters, pointing out that the existing AAPSO headquarters in Cairo were equipped to act in this role, and were logistically more accessible in terms of international travel. After intense lobbying and debate, AALASO was formed as a parallel organisation. But although this defeated the ANC's objective of a single, united, anti-imperialist organisation, Resha felt that the ANC's reputation had been enhanced. Even

33 ANC London Office report by Mazisi Kunene, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 12, ANC Archives, UFH.

554 34 Segal, 1964, p 42.

those who supported the creation of a parallel structure 'admitted, tongue in cheek, that in principle we [the ANC delegation] were correct',³⁵ said Resha. As a bonus, the ANC delegation made a definite impression on the Cubans, who immediately arranged a bilateral meeting between the two groups and declared their willingness to provide more material support for the ANC's cause.

External Missions in Africa and Asia

During the 1965 Morogoro Consultative Conference, Tambo designated the primary focus areas of the ANC External Mission as being diplomatic relations, fundraising, information and support services for ANC combatants. To give impetus to these activities, the ANC strengthened working relationships with a number of governments and international organisations. The conference requested the ANC to establish an office in Ghana to implement a programme that served all the English-speaking West African countries. The office opened in August 1965 and was manned by Matlou. For many years the ANC had looked to Nkrumah's Ghana because of its prestige and the strong stand it had taken to facilitate African emancipation from all forms of alien rule.³⁶ The PAC had won support in Ghana's influential Bureau of African Affairs, but a change in the Bureau's attitude was indicated in a letter to Tambo from Ofori Bah, who had temporarily replaced Barden as the head, in which he wrote:

It seems to me that this is about the time that we, that is to say you and me, should reconsider our attitudes and relations. There may have been reasons for the rather weak relations between your party and the Bureau in the past, but I wish to say here and now that we should forget the past and repair our relations. I have always considered that our policy towards the ANC needs considerable change.³⁷

The Bureau of African Affairs welcomed Matlou and supplied the ANC office with stationery, furniture, equipment, transport and other resources. It also provided an allowance of £35 a month. The change of heart can be attributed to the tenacity and tactical acumen of the ANC's foreign affairs exponents who, during informal discussions with their Ghanaian counterparts at various international solidarity forums, kept the door open for reconciliation.

From the outset, Matlou detected an antagonistic attitude towards the ANC from some of the Ghanaian officials, who remained pro-PAC. Not surprisingly,

35 R Resha, report on Havana Conference, 1966, ANC Morogoro Papers, ANC Archives, UFH. Resha argued for a change in strategy and tactics to the extent that 'from now on we must put our struggle and our problems first. Everything else second ...'.

36 See JD Matlou, 'Notes on the West African Mission', 'ANC Accra office', ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, ANC Archives, UFH.

37 B Ofori Bah, letter to OR Tambo, 8/6/1965, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, ANC Archives, UFH.

he did not attend a PAC-sponsored conference for southern African freedom fighters that was held in his host country.³⁸ In order to make his mark in the generally hostile environment of Accra, Matlou embarked on an intensive publicity and propaganda campaign: producing a monthly newsletter, writing articles for newspapers and scripts for radio talk shows, joining various NGOs and building up his personal relationships with those who could be useful to the ANC.

In November 1965, the ANC's Accra office published a bulletin entitled *SA Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*. Of the 700 copies produced, approximately 480 were sent to government officials, foreign embassies and civil society organisations.³⁹ Lack of funding, despite appeals to both the Bureau of African Affairs and the OAU's African Secretariat, prevented publication for the next two months and by February 1966, Nkrumah had been toppled from power in a coup d'état.⁴⁰ The coup leaders expelled all the liberation movements immediately (though this decision was later reversed) and the ANC closed its Accra office in April.⁴¹ Matlou left Ghana via Nigeria, which he saw as an alternative venue for an office, as a fair number of South African teachers had settled there.⁴²

Most ANC representatives operated under adverse conditions, on shoestring budgets and sometimes without enough basic foodstuffs. New exiles inevitably made their way to the foreign offices, which were simply expected to provide food, shelter, transport and financial aid until the newcomers found their feet. Through the efforts of Dadoo, Marks, Indira Gandhi, the Communist Party of India and Baren Ray of the Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity, the ANC opened an office in India in 1967, manned by Alfred Nzo and Mauvli Cachalia. The move was welcomed by the Indian government, the Communist Party of India, the All India Youth Federation and the Indian Council for Africa. India, the first of the overseas colonies to gain independence from Britain in 1947, was instrumental in the formation of the UN's Standing Committee on Apartheid and in 1952, led the way in calling on the General Assembly to place the racial question in South Africa on its agenda for the first time in the UN's history. Up to that time, UN debates on South Africa had been limited to the treatment of people of Indian and Pakistani origin and the status of South West Africa. India convinced a cross-section of Asian (and later African) countries to support its efforts and the matter was referred to the UN's Ad Hoc Political Committee for debate. As a result, South Africa became a permanent and major item on the UN's agenda for decades to come.

India was also the first country to sever trade relations with South Africa in protest against its racial policies. The decision to impose economic sanctions

38 See Matlou's Supplementary Report, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, ANC Archives, UFH.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid; see also Matlou's report on finance.

41 Matlou, 'ANC Accra Office', May 1966, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, ANC Archives, UFH.

42 Ibid, 'Lagos-Nigeria'.

was taken in principle as early as 1944, when South Africa introduced the Natal Ordinance, which restricted the right of South African citizens of Indian origin to occupy and acquire land. India had substantially increased its trade with South Africa during the Second World War and, for a time, was South Africa's third largest import partner. In July 1946, however, all exports to and imports from South Africa were suspended.⁴³

By the end of the 1960s, the ANC had offices or representatives on four continents – Africa, Asia, North America and Europe – and was meeting regularly at international conferences or at the UN with South American representatives, who consistently voted in favour of pro-liberation UN resolutions.

ISIRD activities in North America

In 1964, the ANC sent Mazisi Kunene to the United States on a mission to revitalise moribund anti-apartheid organisations. In sounding out the possibilities of establishing a South Africa Action Committee, Kunene was greatly assisted by Joe Louw, whose book, *A House of Bondage*, had won international acclaim. After some initial difficulties with George Houser's ACOA,⁴⁴ it was eventually agreed that a committee should be formed, and ACOA helped many of the ANC leaders to obtain permits allowing them to travel throughout the US, after the American government had restricted their movement to the confines of the UN headquarters in New York.

The task of the South Africa Action Committee (SAAC) was to mobilise NGOs into taking up the issue of South Africa and to draw South African expatriates who were members of, or sympathised with the liberation movements into the fray. Kunene urged the committee to badger the influential American press to publish stories about what was happening in South Africa. Meanwhile, assisted by Joe Louw, Dawn Levy and the Reverend Gladstone Mxolisi Nhlathathi, he began working on the publication of a regular bulletin. The SAAC assumed various guises in different areas – in Los Angeles, for example, Bernard Magubane, Anthony Ngubo and Martin Legassick ran the South African Freedom Action Committee (SAFAC).⁴⁵ Committees were also set up

43 KN Raj, 'Sanctions and the Indian Experience', in Segal, 1964, pp 197-203.

44 ACOA, a long-standing solidarity committee, was formed in 1953 by American activists. During its launch the prospectus proclaimed that 'one of the world continents is missing from America's conscience'. ACOA was established to help bridge the gap between Americans and Africans by publishing a journal called *Africa Today* and pamphlets. The organisation also took responsibility for introducing African leaders to the American public, and organised meetings, conferences and public events on Africa. Through its special funds, the committee aided petitioners to the UN, including refugees from colonial wars and injustice, and those who were arrested while fighting for human rights and freedom. The committee also provided documentation on issues affecting Afro-American relations being debated at the UN in order to further freedom and equality for Africa, and to speed development for Africa. See Houser, 1989, p 63; and Ch 18; 'What the US can do about Apartheid', *Africa Today*, March 1966, pp 4-6.

45 Martin Legassick, letter to Mazisi Kunene, nd; see also the pamphlets distributed during SAFAC picketing and Legassick's hunger strike, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 12, ANC

in Boston and Amherst, while the American Students Council for Action Against Apartheid pledged solidarity and forged a working relationship with the SAAC.⁴⁶

Kunene was struck by the extent of interest in South Africa among African Americans. At a 1964 conference in Washington, DC, the focus was on America's foreign policy in Africa, and specifically southern Africa. Kunene attended as an observer, but the ANC's London office deemed the conference so important that they had raised funds for Mary Benson to be the organisation's official representative. Shortly afterwards, Mary Louise Hooper was moved from the London office to New York to work with ACOA on the production of a series of publications about South Africa.

To consolidate its position in North America, the ANC sent Robert Resha on a tour of the US and Canada from March to May 1966, under the auspices of ACOA. On instructions from Tambo, the official committee set up to liaise with ACOA, consisting of Magubane, Louw, Nhlabathi, Ben Mtshali, Bethuel Setai and Paseka Khabele, had to cooperate with ACOA in order to ensure that Resha had sufficient time to attend to ANC business during his visit.⁴⁷

The tour covered New York, Washington, Pittsburgh, Boston, Atlanta, Chicago, Madison, San Francisco, Los Angeles in the United States, and Toronto and Ottawa in Canada. In each centre, Resha's dual purpose was to inform the public about the situation in South Africa (and the less-than-stellar role played by the US and Canada in bringing about change) and to raise money for the Defence and Aid Fund. In Resha's opinion, the tour was long overdue, and he warned that the ANC needed to be pragmatic in its expectations of US support:

We must know that we are dealing with the enemy of our organisation. We must be under no illusion that our political invasion of this country is, in itself, going to change American government attitude towards us as a political organisation ... seems to me that this leads to two divergent schools of thought. The first is that the US is against us, so to hell with them, we will include them among our enemies. The second school of thought, while accepting the analysis of American motives, takes the attitude that it is not in the interests of the struggle of our people to make it easier for America to join forces with the Verwoerd racist regime.⁴⁸

Resha's tour was generally successful and he managed to make contact with various solidarity groups. In order for a permanent representative to raise

Archives, UFH. See also Legassick's letter addressed to Kunene, 23/12/1964; *Los Angeles Times*, 16/12/1964.

46 Mazisi Kunene, ANC London Office Report, 10/10/1964, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 12, Archives, UFH.

47 ANC Coordinating Committee, report on Robert Resha's tour of the United States and Canada, March–April 1966, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 3, ANC Archives, UFH.

48 Robert Resha's report on tour of USA and Canada, March–May 1966, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 3, ANC Archives, UFH.

funds in the US on an ongoing basis, as recommended by the coordinating committee, the ANC had to register with the Justice Department. In July 1966, the NEC authorised the committee to serve as the ANC's official US representatives, with Magubane as chairman and Mtshali as secretary. Mtshali, a political scientist by profession, advised ANC headquarters that in his opinion, the committee met the registration requirements.⁴⁹

The US Foreign Agents Registration Act came into effect in 1966, when the Justice Department ordered the Alexander Defence Committee (ADC) to register as 'agents of a foreign principal'. The ADC was an anti-apartheid body formed by IB Tabata and named after Neville Alexander. The purpose of the Act was to warn the American public that the organisation in question was receiving funds and guidance from abroad, rather than that it espoused a foreign cause. Both the sponsors and officers of the ADC were Americans, but part of the \$14 000 they had raised was sent to South Africa to assist the families of political refugees. Mtshali advised that the ANC committee based in the US could claim involvement in similar projects. The Act exempted the Chase Manhattan Bank and First National City Bank from registration as agents of South Africa, as both banks were important US funders that had extended liberal credit to the apartheid state and its agencies.⁵⁰ The US government's passionate opposition to South Africa's liberation movements was reflected in a September 1964 National Security report, entitled *Who's Who in the Campaign against South Africa*.⁵¹

The OAU's role in the liberation struggle

In spite of its weaknesses, the OAU was a vital source of support for all the liberation movements in Africa. In May 1963, the summit of independent African states in Addis Ababa, which established the OAU, resolved to speed up the liberation of African peoples still under foreign or white rule. One of the first OAU structures was the Liberation Committee, responsible for coordinating assistance from African states and managing a special fund set up for that purpose. The committee included representatives from Algeria, Ethiopia, Congo-Kinshasa, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, United Arab Republic and Tanzania, but none from the liberation movements themselves.⁵²

Not all African countries supported the OAU policy on South Africa. For example, throughout the 1960s Malawi, led by Hastings Banda, adopted a for-

49 ANC Coordinating Committee, report on the USA-Canada tour, and D Nokwe's letter to Mtshali, 14/7/1966, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 3, ANC Archives, UFH.

50 'Opinion', *Africa Today*, May 1966, p 3.

51 USA Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), *Who's Who in the Campaign against South Africa*, 10/9/1964, University of Michigan.

52 See Tandon, 1972; I Wallerstein, *Africa – The Politics of Unity: An Analysis of a Contemporary Social Movement*, Random House, New York, 1967; F Addona, *The Organisation of African Unity*, World Publishing, Cleveland, 1969; Z Cervenka, *The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter*, Hurst, New York, 1969.

mal policy of rapprochement with the South African government. Banda's attitude was that 'African states north of the Zambezi must stop thinking that they can solve the problems of South Africa by shouts and threats in Addis Ababa, London or New York'.⁵³ In 1969 Banda was still vociferously defending Malawi's relationships with both South Africa and Portugal, publicly castigating those who 'shouted about' South Africa but had never been there, and dismissing members of the liberation movements in exile as professional refugees.⁵⁴

Even after the OAU was formed, African leaders spoke with many voices on the question of liberation for southern Africa. Some states, like Tanzania and Zambia, were consistently optimistic and committed, to the point that both the ANC and ZAPU paid homage to 'the contempt with which these two nations have dismissed threats from Smith and Vorster' as exemplary and commendable.⁵⁵ France, which had vested economic interests in South Africa, exerted pressure on Francophone states not to support the OAU's Liberation Fund. A complicating factor was the situation in Congo after Mobutu Sese Seko's military coup in November 1965. The question of his government's legitimacy divided African leaders.⁵⁶ Nkrumah, for example, urged that Congo-Leopoldville should be used as a training base and argued that there was every reason to accept the offer from the Congolese government to make available offices and accommodation for members of the Liberation Committee. In his opinion, freedom fighters in Tanzania had been exposed to espionage, intrigue, frustration and disappointment as a result of 'entrusting [their] training to ... an imperialist agent'.⁵⁷ Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere responded to what he referred to as Nkrumah's 'curious accusations' by pointing out the unstable political conditions in Congo, and noted: 'If the Liberation Committee should have been housed in Leopoldville, imagine what the consequences could have been.' He contemptuously dismissed the implication that Tanzania was an imperialist state⁵⁸ and took particular exception to Nkrumah's reference to 'an imperialist agent'.

In July 1964, at a meeting of OAU heads of state, Nkrumah lambasted the performance of the Liberation Committee, describing it as ineffective and lacking in positive action. Shortcomings of the military aid and training facili-

53 Tandon, 'The Organisation of African Unity'; *East African Standard*, 30 June 1968. Lesotho's Leabua Jonathan later joined Banda; Nelson, 1964.

54 *Africa Research Bulletin*, July 1969, p 1460.

55 Duma Nokwe and George Nyandoro, 'Meet Steel with Steel', *Sechaba*, Vol 1, November 1967, p 10.

56 A Zanzolo, 'Crisis in Africa: Behind the Military Take-overs', *African Communist*, 26, 1966, p 15; Tandon, 1972; JK Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism: Uhuru na Ujamaa - A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1965-1967*, Oxford University Press, Dar es Salaam, 1968. See also *Africa Research Bulletin*; M Legassick, 'The Southern African Block: Integration for Defense or Expansion', *Africa Today*, 15 (5), October/November 1968.

57 *Africa Research Bulletin*, July 1964, C 122.

58 *Ibid*, C 126.

ties offered to freedom fighters and unsatisfactory conditions at training camps in northern Africa, particularly Ethiopia, were severely criticised. Nkrumah complained that 'under the Liberation Committee set up at Addis Ababa, the freedom fighters had no real security, and were not provided with instruments for their struggle, nor were food, clothing and medicine given for the men in training'.⁵⁹ Nyerere responded angrily:

Since these accusations are made by a country, the only country that has not paid a single penny to the [Liberation] Committee since its establishment, I do not propose to pay much attention to them. The non-payment of the sum for the liberation of our brethren has nothing whatsoever to do with the alleged inefficiency of the Liberation Committee. The decision not to pay was made before the committee began its work, and the reason was extremely petty. The decision ... was made at Addis Ababa as soon as the conference committed the unforgivable crime of not including Ghana on the committee and of choosing Dar es Salaam as its headquarters. Those who are not ready to join actively in the task should at least refrain from undermining the effectiveness of the liberation movement.⁶⁰

In the latter part of the 1960s, however, the ANC and ZAPU also had harsh words about what was perceived as ineffective and limited support from the Liberation Committee. In a joint statement sent to the OAU heads of state meeting in September 1967, the ANC and ZAPU said:

This is the moment when the Organisation of African Unity must either carry out its obligations of giving firm support to the efforts of smashing and destroying its worst enemies, or be responsible for the reversal of the glorious African Revolution. There can and should be no equivocation and no wavering.⁶¹

The organisations argued that the material support and facilities provided by the OAU fell far short of a liberation struggle's demands. There was a major discrepancy between what was promised, and what the liberation movements actually received. For example, according to Tandon, during 1967-8 the ANC was promised \$80 000 but was given only \$3 940; \$40 000 was pledged to the PAC, but only \$4 600 was received. The shortfall had left the ANC with little choice but to rely increasingly on Soviet funding. The Liberation Committee was bedevilled by corruption, and several member states accused the Tanzanian executive secretary of mismanaging the funds.⁶²

59 Ibid, July 1964, C 122.

60 Ibid, B 126.

61 Extract from a joint statement by Nokwe and Nyandoro, 1967, p 10.

62 See Tandon, 1972; Cervenka, 1969; Shubin, 1999; interview with Winston Ngcayiya, SADET Oral History Project.

On 6 September 1969, the future of the committee was the main item on the agenda at the OAU summit in Addis Ababa. Some members wanted the committee reduced from 11 to eight members, drawn in equal numbers from French and English-speaking countries, while others supported the existing structure, which included representatives of only four French-speaking states. Suggestions that four arms depots be set up close to the borders of countries in which liberation struggles were being waged, were vigorously opposed by states that bordered on the Portuguese colonies, on the grounds that both Rhodesian and Portuguese forces would launch swift reprisals against them. The same countries had previously rejected proposals by both the UN and the OAU that an ombudsman be appointed to control the flow of arms and ammunition through their territories. Countries on which the liberation struggle had the least direct effect, voted for the committee to remain unchanged.⁶³

Despite endless problems with the Liberation Committee, relations between the ANC and the OAU were good. The annual meetings of heads of state tended to adopt resolutions favouring the ANC, which were then forwarded to the UN General Assembly for formal adoption.⁶⁴ In 1970, the seventh OAU assembly adopted the Council of Foreign Ministers' resolution condemning France, West Germany and Britain for selling, or intending to sell, arms to South Africa. Dahomey, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger and Rwanda abstained, while the Congo (DR) and Tunisia expressed reservations.

The rising number of coups d'état in Africa led the ANC to consider various strategic options. James Hadebe insisted on the need to maintain a West African office, firstly because of the danger that the OAU was heading for difficult times, and secondly, due to the instability of African governments, including some in the countries where the ANC operated. Intensification of the armed struggle would require increased material assistance from the External Mission, but because of the seething intergovernmental disputes and disagreements within the OAU, there was a very real danger that such aid would not be available, just when the struggle needed it most. Hadebe cited disputes such as that at the 1966 Conference of Foreign Ministers over the Ghanaian delegation's status; the strengthening of regional groupings such as OCAM; the possibility of a split in the OAU along revolutionary and reactionary lines. All these factors could rock the very foundations of the OAU and lead to contributions to the African Liberation Committee drying up, Hadebe cautioned.

While the OAU was still comparatively united, Hadebe urged, the ANC should establish its own relations with independent West African states and 'recognise the force produced by the violent winds of coup d'état which are blowing over the occidental African states – weak and strong alike'. The organisation should prepare itself for hard times, even if these would be only transitory, so that

⁶³ *Africa Research Bulletin*, September 1969, p 1515.

⁶⁴ R Pfister, 'Gateway to International Victory: The Diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960-1994', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41 (1), 2003, pp 51-73.

... when political stability returns to these countries, it must find the African National Congress having prepared for it. After all, we do not know how long East and Central Africa regions in which we are going to carry on delicate operations, will remain unaffected by this wind.⁶⁵

The fifth conference of East and Central African heads of state, held in Lusaka from 14-16 April 1969 under the chairmanship of Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda, grappled with the question of collaboration, peace and negotiations with South Africa. The 13 governments represented, including Tanzania, Congo, Somalia and Kenya, issued a joint statement, the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa. The manifesto was later endorsed by the OAU and subsequently adopted by the UN General Assembly. The manifesto was based on a genuine desire to find a peaceful solution through negotiations with white-ruled southern African countries, and Clause 12 stated that African leaders had

... always preferred to achieve it [liberation] without physical violence. They prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. They did not advocate violence, but advocated an end to the violence against human dignity, which was being perpetuated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle, even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change.⁶⁶

The enemies of the liberation movement construed this to mean that Tanzania and Zambia no longer supported the armed struggle in southern Africa. Even then, Nyerere was conscious of the danger of despairing too much about reaching the grand objective of immediate liberation of southern Africa countries from white rule. He and his Zambian counterpart decided to support a call for negotiations and peace at the expense of the armed struggle, in order to placate his colleagues from Malawi and Congo, the chief protagonists in the accommodatory stance underpinning the Lusaka Manifesto. However, both South Africa and Portugal rejected any talks with the liberation movements.

Six months later, Nyerere adopted a different position on the Lusaka Manifesto's call for peaceful negotiations. Addressing an audience at Toronto University on 'Stability and Change in Africa' on 2 October, he expressed serious disquiet about the situation in South Africa and strongly defended the right of liberation movements to wage an armed struggle, arguing:

If the door to freedom is locked and bolted, and the present guardians of the door have refused to turn the key or pull the bolts, the choice is very

65 J Hadebe, memorandum, *Notes on the West African Mission*, May 1966, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, ANC Archives, UFH.

66 'Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa', *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1969-70, C 41-C 45.

straightforward. Either you accept the lack of freedom or you break the door down. In such a situation, the only way to get freedom is by force. A peaceful end to oppression is impossible. The only choice before the people is organised or un-organised violence ... by a people's war against their government. When this happens, Tanzania cannot deny support, for to do so would be to deny validity of African freedom and African dignity. We are naturally and inevitably allies of the freedom fighters. We may recognise the fact that we cannot arm freedom fighters. But we cannot call for freedom in South Africa, and at the same time deny all assistance to those who are fighting for it, when we know, as well as they do, that every other [avenue] of achieving freedom has been excluded by those now in power.⁶⁷

Meanwhile, the South African government had launched its own diplomatic offensive in Africa, described variously as an 'outward-looking policy' and 'dialogue'. Various factors led to this approach. The objective was to establish normal relations between South Africa and the rest of the continent. Pretoria offered trade, tourism, investment capital and development loans to African states that would pledge to curtail their opposition to apartheid.⁶⁸ Vorster stated, 'we wish to avoid the dangers of neo-colonialism in any patterns of assistance which may be agreed upon, but we expect in return a recognition of our own sovereignty within our borders'.⁶⁹ What his government wanted was to halt the support of African states for liberation movements, stop the criticism of South Africa's policies and end its international isolation. Authors Brian Bunting, Sean Gervasi, Martin Legassick and Ben Turok argued that if Vorster's expansionist policies succeeded, they would not only lead to southern Africa becoming increasingly dependent on the apartheid state, but would also expand South Africa's sphere of influence to vast areas on the African continent.⁷⁰ In October 1969, South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hilgard Muller, boasted to the UN about existing bilateral and multilateral dialogues with African states that 'would grow in future, despite the Republic's policy of separate development'.

Economic development projects in compliant African states were controlled by the South Africa Foundation, which also sponsored a sub-project, the National Development and Management Foundation. Accompanying prop-

67 J Nyerere, 'Stability and Change', *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1969-70, C 33.

68 *Africa Contemporary Record*, B 289; 'The South African Lobby', 'US Imperialism and the South African Liberation Movement', *Sechaba*, 4 (5), 1970.

69 J Spence, 'South African Foreign Policy', in Potholm, C and Dale, R (eds), *Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics*, Part 2, Free Press, New York, 1972.

70 Legassick, 1968; B Bunting, 'South Africa's Outward Policy', *Sechaba*, 5 (10), October 1971; S Gervasi, 'South Africa's Economic Expansionism', *Sechaba*, 5 (6), June 1971, p 15; Ben Turok, 'The Battle for the Middle Ground', *Sechaba*, 5 (7), 1971, pp 9-13. See also ANC memorandum, 'Programme: Umkhonto', ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 26, ANC Archives, UFH.

aganda described this scheme as a catalyst in the development of South Africa's neighbouring states, starting with education, vocational training and health services.

South Africa continued to assist the former protectorates in the fields of medical services, agriculture, education, broadcasting and other technical areas, and to 'lend' public administrators to the fledgling governments of Lesotho and Botswana. A new Customs Agreement more than doubled each former protectorate's share of customs revenue, and South African companies funnelled investment capital into many southern African countries. Anglo American and Swanepoel Construction, working in partnership with Japanese interests, moved into Congo-Kinshasa to develop virgin copper fields at Musishi, near the Zambian border, and to construct a rail link from the mines to Lubumbashi. A 40-member South African trade mission visited Madagascar, Reunion and Mauritius and announced that it would be fostering trade with South Africa. In November 1969, South African Airways introduced a new service between Johannesburg, Madagascar and Mauritius. Gabon also cooperated with the South African government, but attempts to woo Zambia into South Africa's 'good neighbour' sphere failed. As a result, all direct flights between Zambia and South Africa were stopped at the end of 1968. While the Chinese were building a rail link between Zambia and Tanzania, Kaunda's government made an effort to cut back dramatically on trade with South Africa by bringing imports by road from Tanzania. Dockworkers in Dar es Salaam refused to handle South African goods and Nyerere's government would not allow South African goods to cross his country in transit.

Vorster's outward policy was unexpectedly boosted by a fresh wave of military coups – 28 in 17 African states by 1970. Most of the radical first-generation leaders were toppled, including Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Ben Bella and Modibo Keita. Southern Africa's first coup took place in January 1970 and was staged by Leabua Jonathan in Lesotho after his party had lost the general election. Western countries rejoiced, and the Soviet Union was forced to reformulate its approach to independent African states after discovering just how fragile they were.

In June 1971, the OAU heads of state roundly rejected future dialogue with South Africa, largely thanks to intense lobbying by Nyerere and Kaunda.⁷¹ The ANC, too, was vehemently opposed:

Particularly alarming, and from our point of view even more dangerous, is the reported urging by the leaders of the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana, and Madagascar for negotiations with the Vorster regime. What a slap in the face this is for those men of vision who held such high hopes in the 1960s for the total liberation of the African continent. Our movement badly needs friends, particularly in Africa, where lies not only our politi-

71 'OAU Declaration on Dialogue', *Mayibuye*, 5 (10), October 1971, p 5.

cal base but also our African identity. [African] states that urge negotiations with South Africa are doing a great disservice to our cause.⁷²

On the military front, the South African government was getting stronger. In 1969, Tanzania and Zambia were constantly on high alert for the presence of South African, Rhodesian and Portuguese agents on their soil. A number of sabotage incidents occurred during that year, the most serious being the blowing up of a pump station on Zambia's crucial oil pipeline to Dar es Salaam. Zambia depended entirely on this pipeline for its petrol supply, having cut all oil imports through Rhodesia. Later in the year, an unsuccessful attempt was made to blow up a strategic bridge in Tanzania, across which a large portion of Zambia's imports travelled. Zambia and Tanzania ascribed these incidents to agents of the South African and Mozambican governments,⁷³ and ultimately took the measures the South African government wanted. As Shubin wrote:

Because of such security pressures, the ANC was given unexpectedly short notice to leave Tanzania. In July 1969 the ANC was informed that it had to vacate the Kongwa camp within 14 days. An 'emergency' trip to Moscow for further training was hastily arranged with the help of the Soviet Union, and it was not until 1972 that the cadres returned to the reopened camp.⁷⁴

The ANC and the churches

An issue that was of great personal importance to Kunene and Tambo during the early 1960s was the raising of funds for the MK cadres based in Tanzania. Kunene set himself what even he referred to as the 'ridiculous' target of \$1 million, noting in a letter to Tambo that he had given much thought to his fundraising role, the importance of which was 'highlighted by the frightening description of people in the camps going without food'.⁷⁵ The entire ANC leadership was deeply concerned about the situation in the Tanzanian camps in general. Kunene travelled to France, the Netherlands, Italy and Scandinavia in search of funding, sometimes accompanied by Tambo or other high-ranking ANC officials. Living in exile and being responsible for such vital and demanding work, which certainly did not always bear the hoped-for results, was taxing. In a heart-rending letter to Tambo, Kunene highlighted the challenges of politics in exile:

72 'Fighting Talk: Beware the Temptor', 'Mauritius Collaboration', 'Non-Aligned but Committed', *Sechaba*, 5 (1), January 1971, pp 2-3; A Nzo, 'Fighting Talk: Dialogue is Betrayal', *Sechaba*, 5 (5), February 1971, pp 2-3; D Nokwe, 'No to Dialogue', *Sechaba*, 5 (6), June 1971, p 3; B Turok, 'The Battle for the Middle Ground', *Sechaba*, 5 (7), 1971, pp 9-13.

73 *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1969, B 291.

74 Shubin, 1999, p 99.

75 Mazisi Kunene, letter addressed to Tambo, nd; and second letter addressed to Tambo, incorrectly dated 12 January 1958, BC 1081, Simons Collection, Department of Manuscripts and Archives, UCT.

I remember how I continued to be frustrated at the unfinished episode in France [trying to raise funds for the ANC camps]. I wondered for instance how you [Tambo] eventually managed with no plane to London, late at night, with only Africa's great humanitarian and paternal civilisation as the sole hope in the situation. I could not agree with you more, London politics are the politics of the scavengers. They eat up and devour the bones with an almost impersonal relish. One cannot help feeling that the exile mentality operates more in London than any other part of the world, so that people go round in huge ... motions of action and then settle down in a blanket of desert dust. You were landed in this desert storm; the after-effects for you have been very costly both in personal health terms and in terms of the struggle.⁷⁶

Between 1933 and 1945, anti-Semitism and racism were the issues that dominated the World Council of Churches (WCC). Church leaders frequently protested against the persecution of Jews by Hitler's Nazi thugs, and in the post-war period, from 1949 until the 1960s, WCC policy statements urged members to eliminate racist practices in their own ranks. They were also advised to denounce human rights violations through discrimination on grounds of race, colour and creed. Immediately after the end of the Second World War, South Africa's policy of apartheid became a central point of discussion at every WCC Central Committee meeting.⁷⁷

A multiracial delegation of the WCC and member churches in South Africa participated in a consultative meeting in Johannesburg in 1960. At the conference, 80% of the South African delegates supported the right of African people to own land, to equal employment opportunities and education. The right to participate in government was also emphasised. In short, the WCC declaration supported the struggle against apartheid, the struggle for freedom and human rights in South Africa.⁷⁸

Between November 1963 and 31 July 1965, the Christian Council of Tanganyika (CCT) assisted various liberation movements to pay some of their bills with monies drawn from a special fund set up by the British and World Councils of Churches. The payments were made as an emergency measure until more permanent programmes could be introduced, and emanated from the WCC's constant encouragement of members to adopt a firm and vigorous stand in working for a deeper understanding of essential human rights 'if men are to be free to do the will of God'.⁷⁹ In order for the victims of racism to

76 Ibid. See also interviews with Mazisi Kunene, conducted by Sifiso Ndlovu, 9 September 2000 and 10 December 2000, Durban, SADET Oral History Project.

77 World Council of Churches, *Ecumenical Statements on Race Relations: Development of Ecumenical Thought on Race Relations, 1937-1964*, Geneva, 1965; J van der Bent, *World Council of Churches: Statements and Actions on Racism 1948-1979*, WCC Programme to Combat Racism, Geneva, 1980.

78 'Mission in South Africa', WCC, Geneva, 1961, in Bent, 1980.

79 Statements from the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches (Amsterdam), Geneva, 1948.

regain a sense of their own worth and be able to determine their own future, all churches were encouraged to make economic and educational resources available to the oppressed and underprivileged.

Through the Reverend EA Hawley, pastor for refugees, the CCT assisted the exiles in numerous ways. CCT thrift shops kept hundreds of exiles clothed, even though garments were limited to one per person, and were supplied only on receipt of an official note from one of the liberation movements, certifying that the recipient was in dire need of clothing.⁸⁰

ZK Matthews, the Africa Secretary of the WCC, drew up the policy document on assistance for refugees, identifying various basic needs such as a food allowance for those not receiving government support, rent for hostels, medical care and clothing. Certification had to be obtained from the authorities that the claimants were recognised as refugees and were not receiving government support.⁸¹ Among those who benefited from the CCT support were MK cadres and students, and the CCT also assumed responsibility for the food accounts at Morogoro. Sometimes, beds and mattresses formed part of the aid, along with scholarships for students from southern Africa. Scandinavian and East European countries, in particular, allowed students entry to their countries in order to pursue higher education. On 5 October 1964, the various liberation movements were asked to submit their budgetary needs to a CCT committee consisting of Hugh Foot and ZK Matthews, as the WCC's representatives. Hadebe submitted a budget on behalf of the ANC refugees that covered the following:

- rental and accommodation;
- food, water and electricity;
- medical expenses;
- fuel and firewood;
- clothing and shoes;
- sports equipment such as footballs and boxing gloves;
- gardening tools and seed;
- school fees for children;
- academic scholarships from primary school to university level; and
- transport, including journeys from South Africa to Bechuanaland, Zambia and Tanganyika.

Hadebe's estimated expenditure was 85 576 Tanzanian shillings per annum, excluding items supplied by other donors.⁸²

80 Memorandum from Hawley to the various chief representatives of the liberation movements, nd, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 5, ANC Archives, UFH.

81 Memorandum, 'Request for Food Assistance' from the Reverend M Hess, Secretary for Relief and Service, to J Hadebe, 4/3/1964; see also Hawley's memorandum of 17/9/1964, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 5, ANC Archives, UFH, and www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history for ZK Matthews, 'The Road from Non-Violence to Violence', speech presented at a conference sponsored by the World Council of Churches, Kitwe, May 1964.

568 82 ANC memorandum to Hawley, 5/10/1964, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 5, ANC Archives, UFH.

In order to halt perpetuation of the myth of racial superiority, the WCC was prepared to mobilise all available resources in the fight against discrimination. It believed that nothing less than structural change could create a pattern of justice in which the dignity and freedom of all the world's people would be assured.⁸³ In 1966, the organisation declared its support for the quest of African nationals in Rhodesia to attain majority rule.⁸⁴ In 1968, the ANC sent Joe Matthews to address the WCC conference in Uppsala, Sweden, where the WCC took a formal decision to support economic sanctions. The organisation urged affiliates and individuals to withdraw investments from all institutions that perpetuated racism.⁸⁵

The following year, Matthews attended the Notting Hill Consultative Conference in England and presented a strong case for the armed struggle. The church recognised the attempts by African political organisations over a period of many years to bring about peaceful change. Nevertheless, the use of violence to achieve political goals was discouraged and every inhabitant of South Africa was encouraged to support peaceful negotiations.⁸⁶ Intervention by Matthews led directly to the WCC's formation of the Programme Against Racism,⁸⁷ which gave the liberation movements invaluable moral support. One recommendation proclaimed that, 'all else failing, the churches support resistance movements, including revolutions, which are aimed at the elimination of political or economic tyranny that makes racism possible'.⁸⁸

Many sceptics were dismissive of the WCC's change of heart when Matthews returned from Notting Hill. In fact, his recollection was that Slovo laughed at the idea of the WCC supporting the liberation movements. Slovo could not fathom how, given the existing relationship between church, apartheid and politics, the WCC could accept the use of the armed struggle against apartheid. Matthews explained: 'No, you do not understand the issue of religion in a country like ours, which is also Christian and so on; the church is so strong.' For his argument at the WCC conference, Matthews used the analogy of the European solidarity movement during the Second World War:

You fellows [European members of the WCC], you established resistance movements against Nazism, you bombed people, you sabotaged trains, killed people, and then you want to prevent us from fighting a violent

83 World Conference on Church and Society, 'Christians in the Technical and Social Revolutions of our Time', Geneva, 1966, sections 3, 4 and 5, in Bent, 1980.

84 Ibid.

85 Statement from the Fourth Assembly of the World Council of Churches (Uppsala), Geneva, 1968, section 5, in Bent, 1980.

86 Statement from Mindolo Consultation on Christian Practice and Desirable Action in Social Change and Race Relations in Southern Africa, WCC, Geneva, 1964, in Bent, 1980.

87 See letter addressed to Tambo from WCC about the WCC's Consultation on Racism to be held in England on 19-24 May 1969, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 11, ANC Archives, UFH.

88 Statement from WCC-sponsored Consultation on Racism, Notting Hill, London, 19-24 May 1969, in Bent, 1980.

struggle against apartheid; you Europeans are inconsistent. When it suits you, you are the most violent people, and then when we have to fight for our liberation, suddenly you say, no, that is not philosophically acceptable for Christians. I said it can't, it's not unacceptable. So that was an interesting development ... [eventually] they did a first-class job of building up that programme against racism.⁸⁹

Significantly, a South African, Bishop Alpheus Zulu, was one of the vice-presidents of the WCC, but he had to be convinced that the ANC was on the right path, and that the church could not stand silent while a crime against humanity was committed by the South African state.⁹⁰ Bishop Zulu, a graduate of the University of Fort Hare, was the first African to become an Anglican bishop and his home was frequently raided by the South African security police.⁹¹ According to Joe Matthews, the support of religious leaders like Bishop Zulu was crucial for the ANC. On 18 January 1971, the WCC's central committee endorsed the decision taken by its executive committee in September 1970 to allocate \$200 000 to the Special Fund to Combat Racism. The ANC was given \$10 000 to help launch the Luthuli Memorial Foundation, designed to inform world public opinion about alternatives to the apartheid system. The money was also earmarked for research publications and audio-visual material, and to assist victims of apartheid.⁹²

Elsewhere, pressure was exerted on American banks and other financial institutions that invested in South Africa. American churches played an important but low-key role in this campaign. Carstens noted that since the 1960s, there had been moralistic condemnation of apartheid by a section of these churches. The First National City Bank of New York and Chase Manhattan Bank not only operated in South Africa, but also openly aided the South African state by means of bank loans. In April 1966, students from the Union Theological Seminary in New York translated their moral revulsion against apartheid into action. Together with clergymen, they publicly protested against the bank's aid to apartheid and closed their accounts at Chase Manhattan Bank. The students then discovered that Protestant churches alone had half a billion dollars in these banks. They called on them to put their money where their moral mouth was and withdraw their funds from banks doing business with South Africa in defiance of proposed economic sanctions.⁹³

89 Interview with Joe Matthews. See also 'WCC Guns for Guerillas Plan Backfires', *The Star*, 9/12/1970.

90 Interview with Joe Matthews.

91 *The Star*, 26/7/1963.

92 World Council of Churches, *Profile of the African National Congress*, January 1971.

93 K Carstens, 'The Response of the Church in the USA to Apartheid', *Africa Today*, 14 (1), 1967, pp 19-22. See also MB Yengwa, 'World Church Support for Liberation Movements', *Sechaba*, 5 (4), 1971, p 8. Besides churches, another major function of the OAU was to fight the liberation battle in the international diplomatic arena. The strategy was to persuade nations to cooperate in economic, diplomatic and military sanctions against white-ruled southern African states.

The Methodist Office of the United Nations decided to withdraw from Chase Manhattan Bank. An influential journal, *Christianity and Crisis*, decided to withdraw its funds from First National City Bank. Other church boards soon followed suit. These actions by churches not only demonstrated the seriousness of their concerns, but also helped, in a small way, to nudge American policy in the direction of imposing concrete sanctions.⁹⁴ Such support from various international organisations, countries and private bodies (in whatever form) was welcomed by the ANC, but some of the church organisations, particularly those who rejected communism as a doctrine, subverted the struggle for liberation in southern Africa.

⁹⁴ Carstens, 1967.